A being which merits this kind of moral attention is morally considerable. It has moral standing, and its welfare cannot be ignored.
Preliminary Distinctions Egalitarianism is a contested concept in social and political thought. One might care about human equality in many ways, for many reasons. An egalitarian might rather be one who maintains that people ought to be treated as equals—as possessing equal fundamental worth and dignity and as equally morally considerable.
In this sense, a sample non-egalitarian would be one who believes that people born into a higher social caste, or a favored race or ethnicity, or with an above-average stock of traits deemed desirable, ought somehow to count for more than others in calculations that determine what morally ought to be done.
On the thought that the core egalitarian ideal is treating people as equals, see Dworkin Further norms of equality of condition or treatment might be viewed as free-standing or derived from the claim of equality of status.
Controversy also swirls around attempts to specify the class of beings to whom egalitarian norms apply. Some might count all and only human beings as entitled to equality of status. Some would hold that all and only persons have equal moral status, with the criteria of personhood excluding some humans from qualifying e.
Some would hold that sentient beings such as nonhuman primates that do not satisfy criteria of personhood are entitled to equal moral status along with persons. Some advance other views. Egalitarianism can be instrumental or non-instrumental.
The instrumental egalitarian values equality as a means to some independently specifiable goal; the non-instrumental egalitarian values equality for its own sake—as an end, or as partly constitutive of some end.
For example, someone who believes that the maintenance of equality across a group of people fosters relations of solidarity and community among them, and is desirable for that reason, qualifies as an instrumental egalitarian.
Someone who believes that equality of some sort is a component of justice, and morally required as such, would be a non-instrumental egalitarian.
Equality of any sort might be valued conditionally or unconditionally. One values equality in the former way if equality is deemed valuable only if some further condition is in place. One might hold that equality in the distribution of resources among a group of persons is valuable, but only on the condition that the individuals are equally deserving.
Equality might be deemed to be desirable or undesirable. A separate and distinct range of questions concerns whether or not people ought to act to bring about equality or are obligated to bring about equality see Nagel The discussion to come often merges these questions, the assumption being that if equality is valuable, that is at least one good reason for thinking one should bring it about.
For those who regard equality as a requirement of justice, the question arises, whether this is a timeless unchanging or instead a variable requirement.
Michael Walzer is one who appears to take the latter view. According to Walzer, a society is just if and only if its practices and institutions are in accord with the shared values and cultural understandings of its people.
But this appearance may be misleading. At any rate, we can identify clear exemplars of theorists who regard equality of a certain sort as a timeless unchanging moral requirement.
John Locke holds that everyone at all times and places has equal natural moral rights that all of us ought always to respect Locke The contemporary moral philosopher Thomas Scanlon holds that all people everywhere equally have the moral right to be treated according to the outcome of a procedure: It is a further question, to what extent this procedure issues in different non-rejectable principles in different times and places featuring different circumstances.
Egalitarianism can be formulated with a variety of roles in mind.
For example, an egalitarian norm might be proposed as a fundamental moral principle. As such, it would be intended as a statement of the ultimate norm or as a member of the set of ultimate norms to which individual conduct and institutional arrangements ought to conform.
An ultimate norm might or might not be suitable for the role of guiding individual decision making or of serving as an explicitly recognized principle regulating institutions and public policy formation in a particular society.
If individual agents and public officials are liable through limited cognitive ability, limited knowledge, or limited allegiance to morality to misapply ultimate principles, it might well be the case that these principles could be implemented to a greater degree if they were not employed directly as decision-making guides for individual and public policy choice.
On this issue, see Hare The Euthyphro dilemma is found in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro, "Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" It implies that if moral authority must come from the gods it doesn't have to be good, and if moral authority must be good it does not have to .
Here are seven justifications for a general moral obligation to help others: You can say we are morally obligated to be helpful to others, but not obligated to sacrifice our life for others. Essay about Moral obligation to help Words 8 Pages Peter Singer said; “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Famine, Affluence, and Morality).
As the world waits with bated breath for the emergence of the latest—and cutest—member of the British Royal Family, allow us to put forth a gentle reminder: In a just world, this innocent.
The contract obligates the firm to complete the work in six weeks.. the problem is of your own making, so don't think that you can obligate me to help. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" is an essay written by Peter Singer in and published in Philosophy and Public Affairs in It argues that affluent persons are morally obligated to donate far more resources to humanitarian causes than is considered normal in Western kaja-net.com essay was inspired by the starvation of .